The Space Shuttle That Fell to Earth is a new miniseries (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt31251016/) currently screening on the ABC and iView (https://iview.abc.net.au/show/space-shuttle-that-fell-to-earth ).

The Columbia mission was the second space shuttle disaster after the Challenger disaster, which saw a catastrophic failure during its launch in 1986. The Columbia disaster directly led to the retirement of the space shuttle fleet in 2011.

About 82 seconds after Columbia left the ground, a piece of foam fell from a ‘bipod ramp’ that was part of a structure that attached the external tank to the shuttle. Video from the launch appeared to show the foam striking Columbia’s left wing. It was later found that a hole on the left wing allowed atmospheric gases to bleed into the shuttle as it went through its fiery re-entry, leading to the loss of the sensors and eventually, Columbia itself and the astronauts inside.

As usual in most accident investigations the focus is often on material and physical cause, ably led by engineers to burn. However, behind every accident stands a culture that enables a hidden, unconscious and sub-atmospheric climate. In this case, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) stated:

‘Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop,’ the board wrote, citing ‘reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices’ and ‘organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information’.

https://www.space.com/19475-space-shuttle-columbia-disaster-investigation-report.html

The miniseries The Space Shuttle That Fell to Earth is a valuable insight into the importance in understanding what culture is and how culture ‘works’.

Even when NASA released its report (https://appel.nasa.gov/2023/04/03/lessons-from-columbia-building-a-knowledge-sharing-culture/) it still maintained an immature and simplistic understanding of culture.

If you want to understand culture, one needs to NOT use Safety, the military or Engineering as a lens for understanding.

If you want to read an appalling understanding of culture, just read anything put out by Safety on Culture. I know, lets write a book on culture then make the main point of the book, to not to talk about it!

Similarly, look at the AIHS BoK Chapters that discuss culture and most of the critical elements of culture are NOT discussed! The last place one should turn for a mature understanding of safety is the AIHS BoK. I know, lets write a chapter on Ethics and make no mention of ‘zero’ or ‘power’. Astounding!

Just look at the DuPont Bradley Curve supposedly about culture and you have a perfect example of what culture is NOT! (https://blog.gooddayswork.ag/blog/dupont-bradley-curve-should-i-learn-more-about-it). Indeed, the toxicity and mythology of DuPont is well documented (https://safetyrisk.net/dark-waters-the-true-story-of-dupont-and-zero/).

Yet in Safety, it seems that the spin and propaganda of DuPont is still believed. Yet the opposite is the case (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jun/02/dupont-pfas-settlement-water-chemical-contamination; https://www.powderbulksolids.com/chemical/dupont-plant-fined-480-000-for-chemical-release).

When your ideology is zero (https://www.humandymensions.com/product/zero-the-great-safety-delusion/), the only way forward is unethical, dishonest enactment, masked with marketing and spin. When you don’t know what culture is, how can you improve it? (https://safetyrisk.net/when-you-dont-know-what-culture-is-how-can-you-improve-it/).

• Systems are not culture.
• Behaviours are not culture.
• Leadership is not culture.
• Engineering is not culture.
• Safety is not culture.

Without a mature understanding of culture as a ‘wicked problem’, it is not likely that Safety can know what to do about it. Have a listen to this podcast by Dr Nippin Anand (an Anthropologist) to get some scope on the problem (https://novellus.solutions/insights/podcast/why-culture-is-misunderstood-a-visual-story-of-costa-concordia-learning-from-accidents-ep-2/).

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Investigation report is an Engineer’s delight. https://sma.nasa.gov/SignificantIncidents/assets/columbia-accident-investigation-board-report-volume-1.pdf  (243ages) https://history2.nasa.gov/columbia/reports/CAIBreportv2.pdf (573 pages).

The overload of engineering data in this report demonstrates the dominance of the engineering perspective. Of all 816 pages of report, the word ‘culture’ is mentioned only four times and even then, does not unpack what culture is. Apparently, everyone knows what culture is and this is assumed. In this way, all of the key elements of culture can remain hidden to continually work unconsciously in the background, until the next disaster.

So, watch The Space Shuttle That Fell to Earth (https://iview.abc.net.au/show/space-shuttle-that-fell-to-earth) and listen to the testimonies using your Culture Cloud (https://safetyrisk.net/culture-cloud-tour-myths-symbols-semiotics-and-religion/) to deconstruct what really went on.