We know that moment when Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of State, declared in 12 Feb 2002, that we have: ‘known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns’ (https://youtu.be/GiPe1OiKQuk?si=lrtA5UwvImfvdI1i ). This was in response to a journalists question about why the USA invaded a country looking for ‘weapons of mass destruction’. We learned very quickly that there were no WMD in Iraq yet, the war continued for 9 more years.

This maxim by Rumsfeld in known as the ‘Rumsfeld Matrix’ (https://www.theuncertaintyproject.org/tools/rumsfeld-matrix) and semiotically looks like this:

Why is this relevant for safety?

One of the profound cultural problems cultivated by the safety industry is a culture of certainty. This is supported by an ethic of deontology (duty) and compliance (https://safetyrisk.net/safety-is-not-a-duty/).

The idea that one doesn’t know something is resisted in safety because uncertainty (risk) is determined as the enemy. Indeed, one of the characteristics of safety is that its knowledge is transferable to other disciplinary domains providing expertise in ethics, culture, anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, counselling and theology. This is evidenced by Safety claiming to be mythologists, historians, ethicists and theologians.

Yet, what is a safety qualification focused on? The Regulation and the Act. What is engineering focused on? Objects. What is the job of Safety but policing and compliance to Regulation.

Indeed, the safety curriculum has next to zero focus on how to manage people, understand decision making or communication skills. When one looks at the AIHS Body of Knowledge, the same perspective is given with 80% of the BoK focus on technical safety. The many post-nominals and NEBOSH focus is on regulation and objects.

Moreso, there is little appetite in the industry for any reform of the safety curriculum (https://safetyrisk.net/isnt-it-time-we-reformed-the-whs-curriculum/). I raised this concern for the curriculum over a decade ago and even if there was some idea of reform, I’m sure it would be done by engaging an engineer.

Procter’s and Schiebinger’s book Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance outlines the problem. Agnotology is the study of ignorance and is connected to the study of faith-belief. The book explores the problem of suppression, dis-information, mis-education and the challenges of paradox, uncertainty, doubt and certainty in the face of ignorance.

In the safety industry doubt is projected as a cultural weakness.

There seems nothing more important in safety than having certainty guaranteed by a checklist. This explains why the company SafetyCulture has become such a profitable company (https://www.startupdaily.net/topic/funding/safetyculture-takes-200-million-valuation-haircut-to-bank-another-75-million/). BTW, there is nothing developed by the company SafetyCulture that has anything to do with safety or culture.

What a checklist provides is a delusion of certainty in a list designed by someone. Whoever designed that checklist was just another fallible person like the next. It’s why checklists fail just as systems fail. But, once a checklist is complete, it provides a sense of false consciousness that things will be safe. It provides a myth of certainty over doubt. Then when things go wrong there is such surprise when a Lawyer demonstrates in court that the safety mindset of trust in paperwork is a liability (https://safetyrisk.net/paper-safe/).

Yet, there is no certainty because risk cannot be eliminated, just as fallibility cannot be eliminated. The ideology of zero is a delusion (https://www.humandymensions.com/product/zero-the-great-safety-delusion/).

But is appears that Safety would much prefer the delusion of certainty than accept the fact that Risk Makes Sense (https://www.humandymensions.com/product/risk-makes-sense-human-judgement-and-risk-audio-book/).

But, this is what Safety does so well, it creates discourse in what is by what it isn’t. This is how we get books on in safety learning that are not about learning, books on better questions that are not about questioning and books on safety culture that are not about culture. It seems in safety if you want to know what you don’t know, you consult and inside the safety cocoon (https://safetyrisk.net/engineering-expertise-and-competence-in-safety-culture/). The best example of this mentality was the ethics course (https://safetyrisk.net/safety-the-expert-in-everything-and-the-art-of-learning-nothing/) proposed as a ‘Global Learning Summit’ and delivered by someone with plenty of meaningless post-nominals with no expertise in ethics. Ah, this is the safety way (https://safetyrisk.net/best-fraud-in-safety-wins-this-is-the-way).

So, in safety, there is nothing more important than playing things safe – keep within the boundaries, be compliant, police the regulation, do your duty, seek knowledge that is safe, and don’t deviate from traditional safety, even when you call it ‘different’. Don’t speak to anyone outside of the safety comfort zone. Demonise the enemy, stay in the cocoon.

Yet, when the global mantra for safety is zero, one is cultivated to deny fallibility, claim certainty and repress doubt. Indeed, when the so called ‘innovation safety science lab’ (with no expertise in ethics) endorses zero as a ‘moral goal’ (https://safetyrisk.net/zero-is-an-immoral-goal/ ), you know that ignorance is central to safety knowledge. All this approach (in non-science) does is amplify safety as an industry of ignorance. When injury rates are deified as proof of safety, zero is made god (https://www.humandymensions.com/product/for-the-love-of-zero-free-download/ ) and fallibility is denied.

A remedy for this insular approach to knowing is Transdisciplinarity (https://safetyrisk.net/a-model-for-transdisciplinarity-in-risk/) and cultivating a culture that seeking expertise outside of one’s discipline. It is critical to education and learning to confirm doubt, fallibility and not fear uncertainty. This is why in safety the best approach to knowing is to interrogate the source, just is foundational to Historiography and all critical thinking.

It all depends if you want to learn and know, and who and what you don’t know. And in the case of Safety it is clear, it would rather not know what it doesn’t know.